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Abstract
The notion of rationality plays a crucial role in Decision Aiding (DA), both as
a scientific discipline and as a professional practice. Indeed, a pervasive and
possibly constitutive feature of DA is that it constantly faces challenges as to
whether it is valid, legitimate, useful, practical, etc. Rationality plays a piv-
otal role in participating to determine whether DA fulfills such requirements.
In this article, we take advantage of arguments developed in the philosoph-
ical literature, mainly by Habermas, to introduce a framework defining a
series of conceptions of rationality. We use this framework in order to intro-
duce a typology of DA approaches, distinguishing objectivist, conformist,
adjustive and reflexive approaches. Whereas the underlying conception of
rationality plays a key role in determining the features of DA processes, we
argue that tools are largely independent of conceptions of rationality. Our
reasoning has direct operational implications, which makes it of distinctive
interest, not only for philosophers and operational research theoreticians,
but also for practitioners. We explain how practitioners should reason in
practice to identify which DA approach they should implement in a given
situation. We then explain how they can take advantage of our analysis to
entrench the legitimacy and validity of their recommendations.
Keywords: Decision processes, Problem structuring, Philosophy of
operational research, Legitimacy, Validity.
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1. Introduction
Any practicing decision analyst knows that, in any decision aiding that s/he
provides, at some point the issue of the validity or legitimacy of her/his
work will resurface. Other requirements, such as usefulness or practical-
ity, are similarly often emphasized. Such challenges are a pervasive and
possibly constitutive feature of decision aiding (DA), both as an academic
discipline and as a professional practice. Focussing on the first two require-
ments, Landry and collaborators [25, 26] famously argued that their precise
content evolved as the discipline of operational research (OR) and its appli-
cations historically unfolded. More generally, one easily understands that,
behind their commonsensical relevance, requirements such as legitimacy, va-
lidity, practicality and usefulness, are interrelated in complex ways. They
implicitly refer to ideals of scientificity, computability and deontology, and
take different meanings depending on contexts and available technologies.
Because DA practice is oriented towards solving concrete problems, these
justification requirements should arguably be understood through the lenses
of “pragmatism” [34, 35], in the philosophical sense given to this term in
particular by Peirce in his famous “pragmatic maxim”:
“Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception (a sign, a
word, a communication) to have. Then our conception of these
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” [41]
In its application to the above requirements, this maxim or principle sug-
gests that it is illusory and irrelevant to look for all-purposes, general defini-
tions – let alone to pretend to deduce them from general abstract concepts.
However, as Ulrich [58] argues, the pragmatic maxim does not deny the im-
portance of conceptual reflection, be it only because applying it requires to
bound the “effects” and “bearings” that should be taken into account.
In line with this idea, our aim in this article is to elaborate an account
of what we take to be one of the most important factors underlying all
the above requirements: rationality. We do not claim that rationality is
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all there is to validity or legitimacy or any other similar requirement, but
rather that it is a determining factor for all of them – a determining factor
to which it can prove particularly useful to appeal in practice to vindicate
the credentials of our analyses and recommendations.
This idea is naturally suggested by the distinctive aim of DA to intro-
duce “elements of rationality” in handling problems [55]. Similarly, the very
concept of “rational choice” [1], which plays an important role in many DA
frameworks, echoes the importance of rationality. References to rationality
are hence pervasive in DA, but what exactly is its role in DA? To articulate
clearly this question, it is useful to introduce the following definitions.
We consider situations schematized as interactions between an Analyst
(A) and a Client (C) or a decision-maker (the distinction between the two,
though important in some contexts, will be left aside here). This schematic
representation is a profound simplification of real-life DA interactions, but
it will prove sufficient here. Such interactions involve a series of entities:
A first set of entities, which we will term “tools”, encompasses: mathe-
matical procedures (sequences of elementary mathematical operations trans-
forming a mathematical structure into another, e.g. inverting a matrix,
transitively closing a graph, etc.); algorithms (sequences of mathematical
procedures with a precise information handling purpose, e.g. the simplex al-
gorithm, variants of the SAT-algorithm, etc.); protocols (sequences of math-
ematical procedures and/or input/output steps allowing to collect informa-
tion and to interact with C, e.g. the construction of a utility function,
indifference swaps in conjoint measurement, etc.); methods (sets of algo-
rithms and protocols allowing to analyse information for some DA purpose,
e.g. the Branch and Bound method, multiple criteria decision analysis meth-
ods, etc.); models (structural representations of the elaborated information,
see the definition “evaluation model” in [6] and [55]).
As opposed to tools, a “decision aiding process” refers to all the work
that A does in his endeavour to use tools to proceed towards the resolution
of the problems he tackles when aiding C [55].
Lastly, we define an “approach” as a way by which A conducts a DA
process.
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These definitions allow articulating the following more specific questions
concerning the role of rationality in DA:
• Q1: Should one consider that rationality characterizes tools or processes
or approaches or all of them?
• Q2: What does a “rationality” requirement amount to when applied to
the above entities?
• Q3: Are there various conceptions of rationality and, in that case, is it
possible to establish a correspondence between specific types of DA tools,
processes or approaches and specific conceptions of rationality?
In this article, we first develop a framework distinguishing a series of
markedly different conceptions of rationality relevant for DA (Section 2).
We then use these ideas to develop a typology of DA approaches (Section
3). We then compare our typology with classical ones from the literature
(Section 4), before concluding (Section 5).
2. Conceptions of rationality and rational decision aiding
What does “rationality” mean? The whole history of western philosophy
can be seen as a tale of competing answers to this question [18]. A compre-
hensive review falls beyond the scope of this article. Our point here is rather
that different approaches to DA can be distinguished by the conception of
rationality in which they are entrenched.
We start by mentioning a couple of keystone references in the conceptu-
alisation of rationality. We then introduce a typology based on Habermas’
philosophy [18]. Numerous authors have already elaborated on the rele-
vance of various aspects of Habermas’ writings (such as his theory of the
ideal speech situation [57] or his analysis of the logic of social sciences [16])
for the philosophy of OR. Here we focus on a very specific aspect of his
work – his reading of the history of philosophical and sociological “models
of action” – and we show how his rationale on this issue can be extended
to develop an understanding of the notion of rationality relevant from a DA
point of view.
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2.1. The centrality and polysemy of references to “rationality” in the DA
literature
References to rationality are pervasive in the DA and OR literature, in
particular in methodological and epistemological contributions. Ormerod
notices that “[m]ost operational research practitioners would claim that the
advice they give to their clients is underpinned by rationality” ([36]), and he
introduces his “foundationalist view” of OR by recalling the importance
of tackling questions such as “do we conduct our investigations in a rational
way, are our methods rational, and can the advice we give be rationally
justified and defended?” ([39], p. 1). Similarly, Ulrich [57] justified the
elaboration of his “critical heuristics” approach by the need to be able to
produce rational justifications in OR.
However, this reference to “rationality” is not unequivocal. Ormerod in-
deed also highlights that several notions of rationality are typically at play
when one investigates the rationality of a decision-making process, or when
a DA process strives to render a decision rational ([37], p. 478). Similarly,
Jackson [21] highlights how a paradigm such the one of “critical system
thinking” can be crippled if a reductive understanding of the concept of
rationality prevents it from encompassing several forms of rationality. A
striking illustration of this polysemy of references to rationality is the con-
trast between Ulrich’s approach, in which the rationality requirement is
tightly associated with references to value-judgments and the ethics and
responsibilities of experts, and the much more restrictive understanding of
rationality epitomized by rational choice theory. Associated with this diver-
sity of understandings of rationality, this notion is linked in the literature
with several networks of concepts, some of them highlighting its links with
concepts of logic (e.g. [39]), others with the notion of inquiry (e.g. [34]),
still other with the notion of justification (e.g. [35]).
Our aim in this article is neither to provide an extensive review of these
contributions, nor to criticize them. Our aim is to provide a clarification of
the notion of rationality, as it can be used from the point of view of DA. This
clarification should be seen as complementary, and in a sense preliminary,
to the above literature, in the sense that we propose a basic investigation
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of a concept that the above literature takes as a building block, to tackle
more elaborate questions, such as how to provide rational foundations to
OR theory and practices [39], how to elaborate a framework to identify and
discuss normative and practical implications of DA processes [57] or how to
foster creativity in problem solving [15]?
2.2. First steps towards conceptualizing rationality
Standard dictionary definitions of “rationality” refer to ideas such as having
good sense and sound judgement (hence phrasings such as “his rationality
was impaired by anger”). The idea of acting based on reasoning and co-
herence are also typically mentioned: one establishes a principle and acts
“rationally” if one remains coherent with it. “Coherence” here can refer to
a reasoning principle, an objective to achieve, a procedure to follow, etc.
Beyond these commonsensical but barely informative ideas, the contem-
porary understanding of rationality in social sciences is largely associated
with Weber [60]. This literature defines a form of rationality called “sub-
stantive” in terms of goal attainment: an agent is rational in that sense if
s/he cogently chooses the means to achieve her/his objectives. By contrast,
“procedural rationality” refers to adherence to a rule: when facing a prob-
lem, an agent is procedurally rational if s/he correctly uses the appropriate
procedure.
Simon [50] famously pointed out that such models of rationality presup-
pose that agents have perfect knowledge of the objectives to attain, the rules
to abide by and the resources needed. Such assumptions are demonstra-
bly unrealistic in real-world decision processes. Simon [49, 51] accordingly
observed that real decision-makers do not obey these rationality models.
To overcome them, Simon introduced the concept of “bounded rationality”.
This approach is anchored in a principle of “satisficing” (a Scottish term that
Simon revived to expose his views), according to which decision-makers typ-
ically content themselves with solutions that they subjectively and locally
deem “satisficing”. The bounded availability of information and resources,
as well as bounded capacities to process information, result in a behaviour
that is rational but falls short of the standards set by visions like Weber’s.
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2.3. Habermas’ typology of models of action as template
Both Weber’s and Simon’s understandings of rationality refer to the be-
haviour of a single agent who aims to be “rational”, presumably to make
sure or to convince her/himself that what s/he decides is the best possible
option, or at least a satisfactory one (we purportedly use the term “satisfac-
tory” here, rather than Simon’s “satisficing”, because our argument aims to
be more general). These visions of rationality ignore the social dimension of
decision processes. They ignore that an agent’s decision often involves other
people, some of which have important stakes in the decision, and that the
agent can be more concerned to convince them rather than her/himself.
Habermas’ concept of “communicative action” [18] is powerful in ad-
dressing such concerns. To introduce it, Habermas claimed that the liter-
ature in sociology and philosophy has been mainly devoted to develop three
“models of action”, which are templates to represent and explain agent’s
actions and decisions:
• The strategic model accounts for an agent’s actions and decisions in terms
of objective facts, concerning the agent him/herself and the context.
• The norm-regulated model accounts for an agent’s actions and decisions
by striving to identify the justified or legitimate norms or expectations
that the agent abides by.
• The dramaturgic model accounts for an agent’s actions and decisions by
striving to understand how the agent portrays her/himself and her/his
inner consciousness before a public.
The first model does not deny that people take some expectations to be
valid, have feelings and live experiences. It claims that these are epiphenom-
ena useless to represent and explain decisions. Symmetrically, the second
and third models take objective facts and, respectively, inner consciousness
and valid expectations, as epiphenomena.
Habermas then noticed that these models share a key feature. All three
are presented in the literature as third person accounts of observed behav-
iors. But all three can be used by actors themselves to respond to criticisms.
7
If an agent is criticized on the grounds that s/he did not took the relevant
facts into account, s/he can (implicitly or explicitly) take advantage of the
strategic model and counter such criticisms by defending “validity claims”
concerning the “objective truth” underlying her/his choices. Similarly, if
s/he is criticized because s/he misidentified what s/he had to do or what s/he
was supposed to do, s/he can take advantage of the norm-regulated model
and counter such criticisms by defending validity claims about her/his “nor-
mative rightness”. Lastly, if s/he is criticized because her/his expressions
were insincere, s/he can use the dramaturgic model and strive to entrench
her/his “expressive or subjective truthfulness”.
An agent can hence account for her/his own decisions thanks to these
models. But, more importantly, s/he can also change her/his own behaviour
in the light of: (i) the various accounts s/he can elaborate, (ii) criticisms
s/he faces and (iii) the relevance of various accounts to counter criticisms.
To account for the dynamics of this process and the importance of in-
terpersonal interactions, Habermas then introduced his notion of commu-
nicative action. This fourth model of action is a reflexive integration of the
three other models: in this fourth model, the other models are conceived as
frameworks that actors themselves can alternatively use in various situations
to defend their actions and decisions. In different decision situations, agents
raise validity claims with respect to one or several validity dimensions, and
they face criticisms by defending their validity claims.
This pivotal step in Habermas’ reasoning is introduced through his no-
tion of “thematization”, which captures the idea that agents typically behave
in standardized or, one might say, “automatic” ways: they do not spend their
time conceptualizing what they do, they most of the time simply do it. But
they can, in some circumstances, step back from their usual way of behaving,
take some aspects of their own behaviour as a theme for examination and
questioning, and change their behavior as a result. Because thematization
allows agents to improve their behavior by transforming “automatic” acts
and decisions into acts and decisions that they are themselves better able
to defend against criticisms, thematization is, in Habermas’ reasoning, the
basis of rationalization. This allows to articulate the following definition:
8
Definition 1. “Rationality” refers to the quality of acts and decisions which
is increased by agents when they thematize and modify aspects of their acts
and decisions so as to improve their ability to counter criticisms.
2.4. A four-terms typology of conceptions of rationality relevant to DA
Here we want to use this understanding of rationality to elaborate a natural
extension of Habermas’ framework, that consists in defining four conceptions
of rationality based on different kinds of thematizations. This idea allows us
to introduce the following four-terms typology of conceptions of rationality :
• An agent acts according to the strategic conception of rationality if s/he
thematizes, and therefore is ready to question and abandon, her/his belief
in the existence of valid expectations that s/he should respect and in the
importance of her/his inner life and feelings, but does not thematize the
assumption that there are objective, external truths independent from
her/his and others’ thoughts and speech. In this conception, the essence
of rationality is the quest of objective, independent truths.
• An agent acts according to the norm-regulated conception of rationality if
s/he thematizes the assumption that there are objective, external truths
and her/his belief in the importance of her/his inner life and feelings, but
does not thematize the assumption that there are valid expectations that
s/he ought to respect. In this conception, the essence of rationality is to
act according to valid expectations.
• An agent acts according to the dramaturgic conception of rationality if
s/he thematizes the assumptions that there are objective, external truths
and that there exist valid expectations, but does not thematize the im-
portance of her/his inner life and feelings. In this conception, the essence
of rationality is to listen to one’s inner life.
• An agent acts according to the communicative conception of rationality if
s/he thematizes all three aspects: the importance of her/his inner life and
feelings, the assumption that there are objective, external truths, and the
assumption that there exist valid expectations.
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In this typology, rationality is no longer exclusively defined in terms of
how an individual agent understands her/his own action and decisions or ex-
clusively in terms of how an external observer can analyze them. An agent
can be forced or incited or driven to thematize various elements of her/his
actions and decisions because s/he is criticized by others, or because s/he
wants to convince them of something. An agent can obviously decide on
her/his own to thematize some aspects of her/his action, without commu-
nicating with anyone. But just like talking to oneself is only possible for
someone who has learnt conversation in pluri-individual settings, similarly,
solitary thematizations are derived from interpersonally-prompted ones.
3. DA approaches as embodiments of conceptions of rationality
In this section, we use our typology of conceptions of rationality to define
four types of DA approaches, distinguished by the conception of rationality
in which each is embedded.
In order to explain our typology in concrete terms, we also introduce two
series of examples. For each item of the typology, we first spell out a fictive,
explanatory example, and then an example of a real-life DA process. Because
a choice had to be made between myriads of possible examples, and because
we wanted the exposition to remain homogeneous, we arbitrarily chose a
problem of locating stationing medical emergency vehicles to structure the
explanatory examples, and environmental policies for real-life examples.
3.1. The theory: four types of DA approaches
3.1.1. Objectivist DA approaches
We call a DA approach “objectivist” when it is shaped by the strategic con-
ception of rationality. Such an approach admits that there are such things
as objective and unquestionable formulations of the problem facing C, and
objective and unquestionable solution(s) (or an objective and unquestion-
able absence of solution), independent of the idiosyncrasies of C, her/his
context of decision and the stakeholders concerned by her/his decisions.
In this approach, these objective formulations and solutions are not to be
questioned during the DA process, they are a pre-requisite constraining the
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whole process. They can be defined by a philosophical theory, which is then
taken to be true. For example, hedonistic utilitarianism is a doctrine stat-
ing that aggregate happiness, measured for example by experienced utility,
should be maximized [53]. This doctrine can be used to define an objec-
tivist DA approach, through which one assumes that the problem tackled
(whatever it is) should be solved in such a way as to maximize aggregate
happiness. More prosaically, the formulation of the problem can be dictated
by the stated will of an authoritative third party, such as someone higher
than C in the organization’s hierarchy.
In an objectivist DA approach, the task of C and A is to compute the
problem according to the adopted formulation and to identify the corre-
sponding solutions (if any). Deviations from the standards set by these for-
mulations and solutions reflect mistakes or shortcomings of C’s, who should
be aided in learning to decide in a “correct” way.
As opposed to the assumed objective truths defining what is here taken
to be “correct”, the two other aspects of action pinpointed by Habermas,
valid expectations and inner consciousness, are admitted to be liable to be
questioned by objectivist DA processes. For example, if C thinks that s/he
is expected or has a duty to behave in a certain way, but this expectation is
at odds with the recommandations produced, then the above expectations
should be discarded. Similarly, if C’s inner feelings or consciousness lead
her/him to question the identified solution(s), C should hold them back.
Example (explanatory) 1. C asks help from A to find the minimum
number of locations for stationing medical emergency vehicles so that ev-
ery village in a region can be reached by an ambulance within a pre-specified
number of minutes. This problem statement, including the objective to min-
imize and the maximum number of minutes, is taken as unquestionable by
both A and C. A develops an optimization model using a standard OR set
covering model. The role of C, after formulating the request, is to provide
the necessary data (average speed of the ambulances, eligible routes, etc.).
Example (real-life) 1. In the Ile-et-Vilaine department, in France, the
local administration owns various areas considered to be of environmental
value, and regularly asks, through public procurements, for decision help
to consulting firms in order to elaborate management schemes for plant
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species and natural habitats. For these public procurements, the department
uses contractual requirements elaborated by an authoritative third party, the
Botanical Conservatory. The requirements specify the entities that the con-
sulting firm will have to study, the methods that they will have to use, and
how they should value and prioritize the various entities. All these elements
are untouchable fixed points that both A and C are expected to take as abso-
lute references. For more details see [29].
3.1.2. Conformist DA approaches
We call a DA approach “conformist” when it is shaped by the norm-regulated
conception of rationality. These are approaches aimed at aiding C to make
a decision that s/he and the other people involved will consider conform to
what C is expected to do or has a duty to do, or conform to what appears
satisfactory. The main threat that C is concerned to avoid is that her/his
decision will create problems because other people consider that “that’s not
what has to be done”. A’s task is to identify relevant insights to under-
stand the kinds of decisions and the features of decisions that render them
“satisfactory” in the specific context of the DA process.
For the purpose of identifying such “satisfactory” decisions, this ap-
proach can draw on a vast literature empirically addressing human judgment
and behaviour [20, 24, 44]. This literature often refers to “biases” because
it was originally intended to overcome weaknesses of economic models set-
tings unrealistic standards. But the reason why such studies provide the
most important material for conformist approaches is independent of this
academic dispute: it is that this literature produces descriptive accounts of
the way people behave and expect others to behave. Beyond this literature,
the material available for this approach may encompass organization theo-
ries, the past experience of C’s organization, and other empirical knowledge
about what works well or does not work well. Such accounts often involve
rules of thumb, shared practices, “ways of doing things” which altogether
delineate what an agent and the various other people involved will consider
to be a satisfactory solution or decision.
In this approach, the core assumption is that there are justified expec-
tations, things that “have to be done”. As opposed to these assumed valid
12
expectations, the two other aspects of action pinpointed by Habermas, the-
oretical truth and inner consciousness, are admitted to be liable to be ques-
tioned. If C’s inner feelings or consciousness are at odds with the recom-
mendations produced, then they must be discarded; similarly, if it appears
that objective facts contradict the recommendations, it must be that these
alleged facts are misconceptions or illusions.
Example (explanatory) 2. C asks help from A to find where to locate
stationing medical emergency vehicles in his area. A investigates how simi-
lar problems have been tackled in different regions, and gathers information
about the settings that proved most acceptable to Clients and to the general
population. Based on extensive questionnaire surveys and statistical analy-
ses, s/he proposes a setting that s/he expect will not arouse any outcry.
Example (real-life) 2. Natura 2000 is a European-wide network of natural
sites and agricultural lands benefiting from environmental regulation because
they shelter species of wild fauna and flora or natural habitats considered
of “community interest” according to European legislations. In France, this
environmental regulation implies that, on each and every Natura 2000 site, a
dedicated action plan must be carved out and implemented so as to ensure the
conservation of the species and habitats concerned. However, as a matter of
legal requirement, the action plan should be entirely “voluntary”: it cannot
involve any mandatory action and should be entirely based on the goodwill
of stakeholders. To elaborate such voluntary action plans, local governments
often ask decision help to consultants, whose job is then to implement con-
sultation processes and studies of the economic and social processes at play
in the area, so as to identify a series of actions that will appear acceptable
and will be endorsed by stakeholders. A detailed account of such a process
can be found for example in [32].
3.1.3. Adjustive DA approaches
We call a DA approach “adjustive” when it embodies the dramaturgic con-
ception of rationality by tracking C’s idiosyncrasies. An adjustive DA pro-
cess is purportedly only suitable for a given C in a particular context, it
aims to identify C’s needs, preferences and values as well as possible, with
minimum interference and maximal accuracy.
Since Raiffa’s seminal RAND report [45] there has been a remarkable
development in the DA literature in the direction of “client driven” decision
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modelling [5, 27, 59], suitable to unfold adjustive approaches. Although
C can find it difficult to answer A’s questions and/or can be unable to
provide a complete description of the problem situation and her/his values,
an adjustive approach will aim to provide an answer fitting C’s information
as well as possible. A’s task is to learn about the problem and C’s needs
and preferences, and then prescribe the best solution given C’s needs and
preferences. If these needs and preferences appear to contradict alleged
theoretical truths or to question supposedly justified norms, this means that
the latter are ill-conceived.
Example (explanatory) 3. C asks help from A to find where to locate
stationing medical emergency vehicles in his territory. C has preferences
on the kind of setting s/he wants to see implemented, s/he has priorities
concerning the areas within her/his territory that s/he deems more important
than others, and s/he has preferences concerning the balance to be reached
between providing a service to her/his constituency and minimizing public
expenditures. The task of A is to take all these dimensions of C’s preference
into account to identify the setting that best matches her/his preferences.
Example (real-life) 3. In 2014, the local government in the French depart-
ment of Gironde asked help from consultants through a public procurement
procedure to evaluate and redefine its water environment policy. The depart-
ment had conducted a water environment policy since 1999 without formal-
izing its proper objectives and ambitions. The various agents involved in the
definition and implementation of this policy could only formulate a vague
vision of their aims, and they wanted to clarify this vision by articulating a
series of hierarchized ambitions. A’s work was to help C to understand and
clarify its own aims and to formalize them. For more details see [31].
3.1.4. Reflexive DA approaches
We call a DA approach “reflexive” when it is based on the communicative
conception of rationality. As opposed to the other three kinds of approaches,
reflexive approaches do not start from any fixed, unquestionable reference
point: both authoritative conceptions, behavioral expectations and inner
preferences can be questioned. In line with, for instance, [2, 40, 52], reflex-
ive approaches take the structuration of C’s problem, its formulation, the
identification of relevant tools, and the very genesis of preferences and be-
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havior, as integral parts of what the DA process has to construct, through
continued interactions between A and C.
Reflexive approaches distinctively emphasize two aspects of DA practice.
First, they conceive DA as socio-technical interventions [10, 11], in which C
and A both decisively influence the process and its outcome. This echoes the
view, most prominently held by proponents of Problem Structuring Methods
[46], that the social aspect of the intervention is as important as the technical
aspect. Second, reflexive approaches understand DA processes as learning
processes, where the C increases her/his knowledge about her/his situation
and her/his preferences, which may change as a result (e.g. [13, 17]).
Example (explanatory) 4. C asks help from A to find where to locate
stationing medical emergency vehicles in his territory. A starts by empha-
sizing that C should pay attention to the very formulation of the problem
s/he faces. Like in an adjustive approach, A leads C to express her/his
preferences over various aspects of the problem. But unlike in adjustive
approaches, s/he does not assume that C’s preferences are given and un-
touchable: s/he rather admits that the very process through which s/he leads
C to express her/his preferences can, and certainly should, lead her/him to
form new preferences. Like in an adjustive approach, A pays great attention
to how acceptable various solutions can prove to be. But here s/he uses the
corresponding analysis to feed back her/his understanding of the problem.
For example, based on her/his understanding of the importance that C gives
to her/his constituency’s willingness to accept this or that solution, s/he can
venture that C’s problem might not really be one of stationing medical emer-
gency vehicles, but one of ensuring a feeling of being taken care of by some
parts of her/his constituency. Like in an objectivist approach, s/he assumes
that some well-defined problems can be solved by specific existing tools, but
s/he is cautious not to distort the problem. In all this process, A works to-
gether with C, and the problem as they eventually manage to articulate and
solve it can turn out to be very different from the one initially formulated by
C.
Example (real-life) 4. In 2016, the local government in the French de-
partment of Charente-Maritime asked help from consultants through a public
procurement procedure to elaborate its strategy for its so-called “Vulnerable
Natural Areas” policy. The department had initially formulated its problem
by referring to the elaboration of similar strategies in other French depart-
ments. However, A quickly understood that, even upstream the definition of
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a “Vulnerable Natural Areas” strategy, there were important questions that
the department had neglected, concerning, in particular, the way it wanted
to define the very point of this policy, the relationship that it should have
with other environmental policies, the kind of influence that this policy could
be granted when deciding how to allot the money devoted to various kinds
of environmental policies, and so on. A therefore set out to redefine the
precise scope of the mission with C, to identify with it a shared formulation
of the key problems that they should tackle together. The elaboration of the
strategy could thereby in the end be completed on firmer foundations. For
the detailed story see [8].
3.1.5. Intra-approaches differences
Despite the important differences between approaches that we have just
highlighted, within each of them, there can also be non-negligible differ-
ences. It is important to consider them in order to better understand the
logic of the typology. Above, we already hinted at the main two variants
that are encompassed within objectivist approaches: some are anchored in
standards that are imposed by an authoritative third party, while others are
anchored in standards derived from a (more or less implicit, more or less
acknowledged) philosophical doctrine accepted or presupposed by A and C
(or possibly imposed by one of them). Conformist approaches can be based
on the idea that the best way to fulfill expectations is to imitate the others’
behavior, while others can strive to identify the norms that happen to be
accepted in the situation where the DA process takes place. Still others can
claim that a normative, philosophical analysis of the norms that should be
accepted is a more relevant source than an empirical analysis of the norms
that factually happen to be accepted (a detailed explanation of this contrast
falls beyond the scope of the present article; an example of such a rea-
soning is given in [19]). Prominent variants of the adjustive approach are
distinguished by whether the process aims at fitting what one might call C’s
“shallow” preferences, that is, what he spontaneously expresses or reveals
when the DA process is launched, or rather the more elaborate things that a
dedicated part of the DA process allows her/him to express, such as her/his
informed preferences (see for example [3]). Lastly, reflexive approaches can
put more emphasis on various steps of the DA process: in particular, more
16
emphasis can be put on either the formulation of the problem or in the
construction of C’s preferences.
3.2. Operationalizing the theory
Our analysis so far has distinguished four conceptions of rationality and four
corresponding DA approaches. Although we have spelled out examples il-
lustrating the four approaches in broad outlines, our reasoning unfolded at a
theoretical and philosophical level. From the point of view of OR academics
and DA practitionners, a natural question is whether our philosophical ty-
pology can be useful in practice.
The difficulty to operationalize philosophical theories has been empha-
sized by numerous authors, in particular Ormerod [38]. We argue that our
reasoning does have direct operational implications, which makes it of dis-
tinctive interest, not only for philosophers and OR theoreticians, but also
for practionners. To establish that point, we first explain how practitioners
should reason in practice to identify which DA approach they should imple-
ment in a given situation. We then explain how they can take advantage of
our analysis to entrench the legitimacy and validity of their recommenda-
tions.
3.2.1. How to choose the DA approach to implement
Recall that each of the four approaches presented in 3.1.1 to 3.1.4 is an-
chored in one of the conceptions of rationality defined in 2.3, and each of
these conceptions of rationality is defined on the basis of differential themati-
zations. This naturally suggest that, in a given decision situation, if a given
thematization pattern is distinctively relevant, then the corresponding DA
approach is appropriate.
One can easily identify concrete criteria to determine if the different
thematization patterns associated with the strategic, norm-regulated and
dramaturgic conceptions of rationality are relevant. Such criteria reflect the
fact that, in a given situation, it is relevant to refrain from thematizing a
given aspect of what determines how decisions are made. A prominent rea-
son why this can be relevant is if the situation is such that the aspect at issue
is an unalterable, binding constraint. In order to identify the relevant DA
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approach to implement, what we have to look at is therefore the constraints
binding the DA process.
The DA approach for which this task is the easiest is the conformist one.
Here we look for situations where it can be relevant to question anything
except for the assumption that there are valid expectations that ought to
be respected. As our real-life example in 3.1.2 already hinted at, this is
typically the case in situations where most if not all the actors involved
in the decision or potentially affected by it have clearly established and
entrenched roles and statuses, so that C’s chief aim is that her/his decision
should fit smoothly in the existing governance pattern. These are situations
where the dominant constraint is an irrevocable governance pattern.
The situations where an objectivist DA approach is relevant are those
in which it appears relevant to assume that there are objective and unques-
tionable formulations of the problem facing C, and objective and unques-
tionable solution(s). This is typically the case in situations in which the
decision aiding process is tightly overseen by external experts or expertise
institutions which are considered to be absolute references, and are there-
fore entrusted with imposing the methodologies and tools that A should
use, monitoring and evaluating her/his work, and validating the recommen-
dations s/he produces. These are situations where the dominant constraint
is an unquestionable decision-aiding architecture.
The situations where an adjustive DA approach is in order are those
where the dominant constraint rather comes from C her/himself, in the sense
that what comes from her/him is granted prominent importance, whereas
the other aspects liable to determine her/his decisions can be thematized.
These are situations where the dominant constraint is a sanctified spirit of
initiative of the decision-maker.
Lastly, situations where none of these constraints appears to clearly dom-
inate the other two are situations where the four approaches can be imple-
mented.
Identifying the dominant constraint might be tricky in practice, at least
in some situations. However, referring to Ormerod’s [39] general description
of an OR consulting project in three phases (1 – writing a proposal; 2 –
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designing and planning the intervention; 3 – operating the plan), most of
the time enough information will be given by C at phase 1 for A to identify if
the process is to be implemented in a context where the roles and statuses of
most actors are tightly constraining, or where external experts are entrusted
to supervise the DA process, or where C’s initiative is put on a pedestal. If
A misunderstands the context during phase 1, it is likely that her/his bid
will be rejected, and if it is not, the numerous in-depth interactions between
A and C characterizing phase 2 will likely be sufficient to help A to revise
her/his interpretation of the situation before launching phase 3.
Once this analysis of the putative dominant constraint has been done, it
is useful to complement it with an analysis of the “problem context” along
the lines spelled out by Jackson and Keys [23]. The latter first contrast “sys-
temic” problem contexts, where the systems studied “pose difficult problems
because they are often only partly observable, probabilistic, open, have pur-
poseful parts and are subject to behavioral influences” ([23], p.476) with
“mechanical” ones, which “are likely to pose easy problems” because they
are not plagued by the above difficulties. They then contrast “unitary” with
“pluralist” problem contexts, depending on whether the decision-maker is
an individual or a collective.
In each of the resulting four kinds of “problem contexts”, the dominant
constraint can be an irrevocable governance, an unquestionable decision-
aiding architecture, or a sanctified spirit of initiative of the decision-maker.
A conformist, objectivist or adjustive DA approach can therefore be in order
in any of these kinds of “problem contexts.” By contrast, when none of the
above constraint is dominant, A has more liberty to propose a DA approach,
and in such a case Jackson and Keys’ typology of problem contexts [23] be-
comes particularly relevant, in the following sense. Following these authors,
because “classical OR” techniques are particularly adapted to mechanical-
unitary problem contexts, one can surmise that, in such contexts, an ob-
jectivist DA approach is the most adapted; by contrast, systemic-pluralist
problem contexts are typically contexts where refraining from thematizing a
specific aspect can lead to important errors, which indicates that a reflexive
DA approach is commendable. Depending on whether the collective in-
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volved in mechanical-pluralist context problems is a collective of actors with
which C interacts or a collective C, a conformist DA approach or a reflexive
one is commendable, respectively. Depending on whether C is more or less
aware of the complexity of the systems at issue, in systemic-unitary con-
text problems, an adjustive DA approach or a reflexive one is commendable,
respectively.
The choice of a DA approach is, undoubtedly, a difficult task that can-
not be entirely formalized and involves a good deal of common sense and
intuition, but one can see that, by investigating the constraints binding the
DA process and the nature of the problem context at issue, A should be able
in most cases to form a qualified idea of the most relevant DA approach in
a given decision situation in phase 1, or at least in phase 2, of a typical OR
project. Let us now examine what this identification will be useful for.
3.2.2. Practical implications in terms of validity and legitimacy
The choice of an approach obviously has numerous implications on how A
will work and interact with C. For example, when elaborating models from
which recommendations will be derived, depending on the approach chosen,
the main task for A will be, respectively, to elaborate implications of pos-
tulated exogenous standards (objectivist approach), to gather and analyze
empirical observations (conformist), to strive to unveil C’s system of values
without much interference (adjustive), to search for a mutual understanding
with C (reflexive).
However, from our point of view in this article, the main concrete impli-
cation of the choice of approach is that it will shape how DA practitioners
will be able to address challenges to the validity and legitimacy of their
analyzes and recommendations. Because validity and legitimacy are contro-
versial notions, we do not take a rigid stance on their precise definition. We
simply admit that both refer to justifiability (echoing Ormerod’s [35] em-
phasis on the concept of justification in OR science and practice), but that,
whereas validity is more concerned with scientific justifiability, legitimacy
is more a matter of public justifiability (see [30] for an elaboration of this
approach to legitimacy in an applied DA context).
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Objectivist DA approaches assume that, because the formulations and
solutions adopted are unquestionable, they must be publicly accepted, which
implies that the process is legitimate. Validity is similarly entrenched in the
fact that the formulations and solutions are considered unquestionable. If
asked to entrench the justification of her/his approach, an analyst imple-
menting an objectivist approach will hence fall back upon the standards
and their supposed unquestionability.
In conformist approaches, legitimacy is based on the fact that C and
the people that interact with her/him or observe her/him will consider that
her/his decisions correspond to what ought to be done: the acceptability
of the decision by C and the people with whom s/he works determines
whether the process is justified or legitimate. Validity is judged by how
well the process reflects the best practice in light of existing knowledge that
describes the situation and the actors involved.
In adjustive approaches, the legitimacy of the DA process is based on
the aspiration to match C’s values and preferences as well as possible: out-
comes will be considered justified or legitimate if and only if they appear to
have captured the idiosyncrasies of C, so that the latter can see them as a
truthful expression of hers/his. Validity is then judged by A’s competence
in diagnosing the situation and eliciting C’s values.
As opposed to the other three approaches, reflexive approaches allow
the tackling of the legitimacy and validity requirements in more elaborate
ways – but, as a consequence, they also can involve more difficult and time-
consuming analyses. This is because reflexive approaches are anchored in
the communicative notion of rationality, which is itself based on the idea
that there is no “fixed point” on which A and C can fall back upon: every
aspect of what can determine a decision can be thematized. Accordingly,
in a reflexive approach, any aspect of A’s analysis or recommendation can
be questioned and, as it is an application of the communicative notion
of rationality, A cannot claim that her/his approach is rational unless s/he
can provide arguments that are acceptable, not only by C, but also by the
scientific community (validity) or by the public (legitimacy). This can create
difficult challenges, whose analysis falls beyond the scope of the present
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article (for a partial exploration of these difficulties, see [7]).
4. Rationality and the object of typologies in the DA literature
4.1. Classical typologies in the DA literature and their ambiguities
The reader will probably identify some familiarities between the typology
introduced in the former section and classical typologies found in the DA
literature. Among these typologies, possibly the most famous one is based
on the descriptive vs. normative dichotomy. Descriptive contributions are
concerned with the way people make decisions, as a matter of empirical fact,
whereas normative contributions investigate what makes a decision a good
one. This distinction has been enriched by Bell, Raiffa and Tversky [4],
who added a “prescriptive” term to the dichotomy, designed to capture the
contributions of “the methodologists, the consultants (...) concerned with
the bottom line: how do you improve the quality of decisions in practice?”
([4], p.ix).
Another classical distinction was proposed by Roy and Bouyssou [48],
who distinguished three paths to give meaning to the knowledge produced
in DA: the path of realism (quest for descriptions for discovering), the ax-
iomatic path (quest of norms for prescribing) and the constructivist path
(quest for working hypotheses for recommending), where the axiomatic path
can be combined with any of the other two paths (realism and construc-
tivism).
Having in mind these classical typologies, the reader might see similar-
ities between, on the one hand, the concepts of objectivist, conformist and
adjustive approaches as we define them, and, on the other hand, the con-
cepts of normative, descriptive and prescriptive contributions. Similarly, it
is tempting to identify what we call a reflexive approach with Roy’s notion
of constructive path. Tsoukia`s’ [56] typology of normative, descriptive, pre-
scriptive and constructive approaches also can be seen as very close to our
own typology.
Drawing such parallels would be hasty, however, for several reasons:
First, one might question the philosophical robustness of the above-
mentioned classical typologies. Indeed, as Bell, Raiffa and Tversky them-
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selves emphasize ([4], p.2), the very structure of their trichotomy can be
questioned, because the prescriptive category can be seen as a subcategory
of normative. They accordingly see the trichotomy as a convenient tool
to classify contributions to decision science on a provisional basis, for ex-
ploratory purposes. But they do not give it a more fundamental meaning,
and do not see it as anchored in a rigorous philosophical reasoning. Similarly,
despite the fact that the terms “constructive” or “constructivism” are of-
ten used in the philosophical literature, Roy and Bouyssou themselves never
claimed that their contributions had a philosophical dimension or anchorage.
The same goes for Tsoukia`s’ typology [56]. By contrast, our typology of DA
approaches is based on a typology of conceptions of rationality, which is in
turn derived from a generalization of Habermas’ philosophical theory. This
typology of approaches therefore claims to enlist categories that are neatly
and rigorously distinguished and whose definition is theoretically and philo-
sophically entrenched.
Second, one might claim that it is unclear what the above classical ty-
pologies are concerned to classify. Roy and Bouyssou [48] talk about the
meaning of the knowledge produced, which is intuitively easily understand-
able and compelling, but arguably rather vague: What exactly is the “mean-
ing” of a piece of knowledge? Is it the interpretation that someone has of
this piece of knowledge? Is it permissible that several persons diverge in the
meaning they give to a given piece of knowledge? Roy and Bouyssou leave
these questions and similar ones largely unanswered because their typology
does not claim to have a philosophical dimension. But this implies that
this typology can be variously interpreted and applied to different sets of
objects, which can create ambiguities. Bell, Raiffa and Tversky’s formula-
tions are similarly ambiguous. The subtitle of their famous book [4] talks
about “descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions”. However, it
is difficult to understand how an interaction can be descriptive only: in the
ordinary sense of the terms “description” and “interaction”, if one interacts
with something, one induces changes in this thing, and one can then no
longer be said to have only “described” it. Unless one introduces technical
definitions of the terms “description” and “interaction”, differing from their
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ordinary sense (which the authors do not), a “descriptive interaction” is a
contradiction in terms. A similar comment applies to Tsoukia`s’ usage of the
term “descriptive” to talk about DA processes [56]: a DA process is a series
of actions that eventually aim at providing advices. In that sense a DA pro-
cess can never be confined to a description of what is the case (a descriptive
task), it unavoidably involves envisioning and striving to materialize what
should be the case (a normative task). In line with this logic, Bell, Raiffa
and Tversky’s own application of their trichotomy appears to correspond
mainly to disciplinary differences: statistics, mathematics and economics
are “normative”, psychology and behavioral sciences are “descriptive” and
operations research and management science are “prescriptive”. This sug-
gests that the proper objects that their trichotomy is convenient to classify
are what we termed “tools” in the introduction above. The authors however
do not consistently use their typology in this way, and rather at times use
the term “prescriptive” to refer to an attitude that consists in striving to
apply theories and models to concrete situations, as opposed to the attitude
of researchers concerned to answer more general or theoretical questions.
Though we do not question the cogency, usefulness and relevance of
these three classical typologies, we therefore claim that they are ambiguous
in important respects. This ambiguity is partly due to questionable choices
of vocabulary, and partly to the fact that various typologies use the same
terms in different senses. It is also a consequence of the fact that these
typologies had no philosophical pretentions. But most importantly, these
ambiguities are due to the fact that these typologies did not clarify the
precise nature of the objects they could be expected to be able to classify.
As a consequence, they are rather indiscriminately used to classify tools,
processes, approaches, and even disciplines, which arguably is liable to create
more confusion than clarification. By contrast, thanks to its anchorage in
our reading of Habermas’ philosophy, our typology was elaborated in such
a way that it has a clearly defined object: DA approaches (ways to conduct
the DA process).
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4.2. The interpretative link between DA tools and conceptions of rationality
This contrast between our proposed typology and the more classical ones
found in the literature suggests that, at this stage, it is important to clarify
if our typology, introduced as it was at the level of approaches, can also be
applied at the level of tools.
Numerous decision support tools are available today. They range from
optimisation techniques to cognitive approaches, from artificial intelligence
tools to multiple criteria decision analysis (MCDA) methods, from extremely
sophisticated tools to more “soft”, natural language oriented and user friendly
ones. Each of these tools has been created with a more or less precise (cer-
tainly often unconscious) “philosophical” background (see [16]) and with a
more or less precise conception of rationality (implicitly) in mind. This in-
spiration is sometimes reported as an historical fact by the inventors of the
tools. Most of the time, however, the link between a given tool and a con-
ception of rationality only becomes visible ex post and is to a large extent
interpretative.
For instance, it is tempting to claim that traditional Operational Re-
search techniques such as linear programming or combinatorial optimisa-
tion, as well as expected utility theory and game theory (see the discussion
in [33]), reflect the strategic conception of rationality underlying what we
term objectivist DA approaches. Similarly, one can interpret several deci-
sion heuristics as well as some early artificial intelligence knowledge repre-
sentation techniques as reflecting the norm-regulated conception of rational-
ity underlying conformist DA approaches: they capture the way by which
agents and/or experts make judgements and generalize it. Much cognitive
analysis can be associated to such an effort. Similarly, several multiple
criteria decision support methods can be seen as anchored in the dramatur-
gic conception of rationality. Several artificial intelligence tools also make
implicitly reference to this model of rationality. Note for instance the com-
mon argumentation concerning intransitive preferences in decision analysis
and non monotonic reasoning in logic [14, 54]. Finally, several “soft” OR
methods and several MCDA methods at least implicitly refer to a concept of
communicative rationality close to the one we used to define reflexive DA ap-
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proaches. Indeed, although he cautiously eschewed philosophical references,
Roy’s [47] understanding of the notion of “constructivism” is arguably close
to the communicative conception of rationality as we defined it above. By
clearly focussing on the DA process and the structuring issue, Soft Systems
Methodology [10] endorses a very similar approach.
In these various cases, the tools used in DA historically emerged, as a
matter of fact, from processes that were (more or less explicitly, and more
or less consciously) inspired by various conceptions of rationality. And even
when no such historical inspiration is acknowledged by the inventors of tools,
it is always possible ex post to argue that, at an interpretative level, this or
that tool captures what might be called “the spirit” of a given conception
of rationality. But beyond historical contingencies and (always disputable)
interpretative claims, there is no positive reason to believe that any DA tools
is really anchored in specific conceptions of rationality, in the sense that it
would be nondetachable from a specific conception or rationality (an idea
that echoes, in the terms of rationality, the conclusions of historical debates
in the management science literature, on the possibility of methodological
pluralism [22]). The corresponding possibility to use, in all four different
approaches, tools that might seem to be associated in any one of these
approaches, is illustrated in Annex 1.
4.3. The proper place of rationality
Based on the elements explored so far, we are now in a position to answer
questions Q1-3, from which we started in the introduction:
• Q1: Should one consider that rationality characterizes tools or artifacts
or processes or approaches or all of them? A DA process has a rationality:
it is the rationality embodied in the DA approach used in this DA process.
By contrast, there is no such thing as the rationality of a tool. However,
once a tool has been assigned a role in the DA process, this usage of the
tool is a part of the DA process and, as such, has a rationality.
• Q2: What does a “rationality” requirement amount to when applied to
the above entities? A rationality requirement applied to a given DA pro-
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cess imposes that the Analyst involved should be able to display the DA
approach that he used, and explain why it was relevant.
• Q3: Are there various conceptions of rationality, and in that case is it
possible to establish a correspondence between specific types of DA tools,
processes or approaches and specific conceptions of rationality? There
are different types of rationality, embodied in the different types DA ap-
proaches that we introduced.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that conceptualizing the notion of rational-
ity can prove very useful to understand DA practices. We took advantage
of important insights of Habermas’ to establish a typology of conceptions
of rationality, and we used this typology to introduce a typology of DA
approaches, distinguishing objectivist, conformist, adjustive, and reflexive
approaches.
Our reasoning has direct operational implications, which makes it of
distinctive interest, not only for philosophers and OR theoreticians, but also
for practitioners. We explain how practitioners should reason in practice to
identify which DA approach they should implement in a given situation, and
then explain how they can take advantage of our analysis to entrench the
legitimacy and validity of their recommendations.
However, as repeatedly emphasized, the notions of legitimacy and valid-
ity are controversial and their meaning is certainly largely context-dependant
and unstable. Accordingly, we do not claim that our reasoning here provides
a sufficient picture to elaborate a full-blown theory of validity and legitimacy.
Our more reasonable ambition is to have produce a serious account of a fac-
tor that plays a key role in determining validity and legitimacy: rationality.
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6. Annex 1: Examples of how the same tools can be used under
different approaches
In this annex, we illustrate how the same DA tools might be used in DA
processes according to different approaches, as characterized in Section 3.
For this illustration, we chose four DA tools that can be interpreted as being
associated with different conceptions of rationality:
• Cost-Benefit Analysis [28] (CBA), whose philosophical background might
seem to anchor it in the strategic conception of rationality.
• Data Envelopment Analysis [9] (DEA), which measures efficiency in terms
of a non-parametrical empirical-based efficiency frontier, given theoretical
or practical obstacles to the definition of an economic production function,
and might therefore seem to be anchored in the norm-regulated conception
of rationality.
• Multi-criteria prioritization through Decision Conferencing [42, 43] (DC),
which echoes the dramaturgic conception of rationality by assigning to
the Analyst the role of a “facilitator”, while the Client and/or its rep-
resentatives are expected to contribute all the “content” of the decision
process.
• Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) [10], which might seem inherently linked
to the communicative conception of rationality.
Let us now illustrate how each of these DA tools can be used in any of
the four DA approaches characterized in Section 3.
6.1. CBA
An objectivist DA approach. Suppose C asks the help of the Analyst
to conduct a CBA, since this tool is required by law. The Analyst takes the
criteria couched in law and technical guidelines (e.g. an internal manual)
as given and not questionable. The process is justified as legitimate by the
assumed validity of the criteria and the technically quality of the analysis.
A conformist DA approach. Suppose C asks the help of the Analyst
to conduct CBA, since it is commonly used for similar situations in many
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countries. A applies CBA taking into account her/his knowledge about
how the method has been used before, namely avoiding known pitfalls and
emulating successful cases. The process is justified as legitimate to the
degree that this situation was indeed similar to the cases considered as such,
and to the degree that best practices were followed.
An adjustive DA approach. Suppose C asks the help of the Analyst
to evaluate options, since this Analyst is an expert in this type of problems.
A assesses that CBA is an appropriate method to reflect C’s values in this
situation. A applies CBA and incorporates in her/his modeling the judgment
of C, e.g. in deciding how to discount future values. The process is justified
as legitimate to the degree that A was competent in her/his work to reflect
C’s judgment and needs.
A reflexive DA approach. Suppose C asks the Analyst help to evalu-
ate options, since this Analyst is a DA expert with good process conduction
skills. A proposes the use of CBA at a given point of the decision process,
just to check if under this perspective there would be a clear winner. Many
arbitrary options involved in the modeling exercise are discussed with A, not
neglecting theory and customary practice of CBA. Alternative models are
developed as tools to foster discussion. The process is justified as legitimate
to the degree that A and C deem that the results correspond to coherent
arguments that reflect the issues that were settled during the discussions.
6.2. DEA
An objectivist DA approach. Suppose A asks the Analyst help to
conduct DEA to evaluate hospitals, following a “Ministry of Health Perfor-
mance Evaluation Green Book”. This manual indicates BCC as the DEA
model to be used and enlists the names of inputs and outputs that should be
included. A tries to follow the manual as closely as s/he can, with some free-
dom to define options that the manual does not cover, e.g., how to measure
each input or output. The process is justified as legitimate to the degree that
the manual was followed and the analysis was technically well performed,
that is: the degree to which the exogeneously given standards were adhered
to.
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An conformist DA approach. Suppose C asks the Analyst help
to conduct DEA to evaluate hospitals, since it is commonly used in many
similar situations. A applies DEA taking into account her/his knowledge
about how the method has been used before, namely avoiding known pitfalls
and using inputs and outputs that are common in past highly-regarded
studies. Past studies evaluating the productivity of hospitals lead her/him
to reject an assumption of constant returns to scale, and hence to use a
BCC model. The process is justified as legitimate to the degree that best
practices were followed.
An adjustive DA approach. Suppose C asks an Analyst help to
evaluate hospitals, since this Analyst is an expert in this type of problems.
A deems DEA is the most appropriate tool for this task, according to her/his
expertise. S/he interviews A to find out constraints and preferences on
how to conduct the analysis, e.g., to know which factors are deemed more
important, or which factors are most problematic in terms of data gathering.
The process is justified as legitimate to the degree that A was competent in
her/his work to reflect A’s judgment and needs.
A reflexive DA approach. Suppose C asks an Analyst help to evaluate
hospitals. The problem is initially cast as an MCDA evaluation, but the
difficulties encountered lead A and C to agree that a change of perspective
is necessary. Eventually this leads to the conclusion that DEA seems more
adequate to C’s conception of hospital evaluation as an efficiency evaluation.
A returns to scale assumption is discussed, as well as the choice of inputs and
outputs. The discussion is enriched by building several prototypical models
following different options, allowing exploring and learning the consequences
of the different modeling options. The process is justified as legitimate to the
degree that A and C deem that the results correspond to coherent arguments
that reflect the issues that were settled during the discussions.
6.3. Multi-criteria prioritization through DC
An objectivist DA approach. Imagine that C wants to elaborate an
action plan on environmental sites in her/his vicinity, including a spatial
prioritization of known natural sites, based on known information about
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them, including naturalistic data, information concerning flooding risk, fea-
sibility and cost of various possible actions on the different sites, and so on.
C wants to take advantage of the insights that renown local experts can
provide, because they have a precise knowledge of all the sites concerned.
The knowledge of these experts is taken as an absolute reference. Unfortu-
nately, although the experts are able to make informed claims on particular
aspects, they all have limited competences, and their views therefore have
to be aggregated to identify an overall prioritization. Multi-criteria priori-
tization through DC is used to identify the collective view of this group of
experts.
An conformist DA approach. C is willing to elaborate an action
plan on environmental sites in her/his vicinity, but most of the natural
sites s/he is about to prioritize as part of this action plan are privately
owned, and a large series of economic activities are based on these sites.
C wants to identify sites where s/he can act. A proposes to use Multi-
criteria prioritization through DC so has to identify where C’s actions can
be acceptable by land owners, based on DC workshops with representatives
of land owners or representatives of the corresponding various economic
sectors.
An adjustive DA approach. C is concerned to prioritize natural
sites in her/his vicinity as part of an action plan to be elaborated. She
and her main collaborators can state features of natural sites that they
value, but are unable to say in the abstract which values are more or less
important in their eyes, which makes it impossible for them to define a global
strategy to prioritize all the sites concerned. A proposes to use Multi-criteria
prioritization through DC including her main collaborators to clarify the
value underlying their choices and judgments and systematize them.
A reflexive DA approach. A initially wants to use the information
available on natural sites in her/his vicinity, to prioritize sites for restoration
purposes. S/he asks for A to help her compute the expected benefits of var-
ious portfolios of actions on various sites, using Multi-criteria prioritization
through DC involving a handful of her key collaborators. When unfolding
the usual steps of the method, A becomes aware that the very ambition
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to prioritize sites for restoration purposes might be ill-conceived, because
C fails to identify that numerous stakeholders, which are not involved in
the DC, find restoration actions illegitimate, for reasons that C has never
investigated. A therefore suggests that the whole decision process should
be reshuﬄed, and that a new DC process should launched, involving rep-
resentatives of stakeholders, so as to identify a new overall environmental
strategy acceptable to all.
6.4. SSM
An objectivist DA approach. Suppose SSM is the chosen method,
since the company’s president firmly contends that this is the methodology
that should be used, given its coherence and theoretical appeal, which he
admires since he learnt the method at university. The Analyst was hired in
the sequence of a job offer suggested by the president where knowledge of
SSM was specifically required. The process is legitimated internally by the
support of the president to making SSM the norm for these meetings. A’s
role is to abide by the standard according to the president’s requests.
An conformist DA approach. Suppose SSM is the chosen method
for its track record of successful past interventions, by many facilitators in
many organizations. A has studied extensively these past applications and
uses this knowledge to emulate the best practitioners. The process is le-
gitimated internally by the ample evidence presented by A in support of
method’s ability to succeed in allowing groups to move forward in problem-
atic situations.
An adjustive DA approach. Suppose the Analyst is highly regarded
for his mastery of OR tools. When the president approached him for advice
on how to improve strategic decision-making in the company, A indicated
SSM as the most appropriate tool due to the possibilities if offers to lead the
various persons involved to express their values and preferences, thanks to
soft communication facilitating tricks. The process is legitimated internally
by A’s reputation and her/his perceived ability to facilitate the discussions.
A reflexive DA approach. Suppose that the Analyst is often invited
to serve as an OR analyst at staff meetings. In this meeting, given the
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group’s purpose, he proposed the use of SSM as an exploratory analysis.
Later, s/he argued that the analysis might call for the use of other OR
models, or it might even happen that the SSM analysis would be considered
sufficient to support some decisions without further analysis. The group
agreed, knowing also that if the SSM analysis happened to become unpro-
ductive, then the Analyst would be the first one to propose the use of an
alternative approach. The process is legitimated internally by the group’s
agreement.
Theses examples illustrate that the philosophical background that can
be interpreted as underlying a given tool does not simply percolates to the
process in which the tool is used. Although the construction of some tools
might have been associated, as a matter of historical fact, with a given
conception of rationality, and although one can always speculate on the in-
terpretative link between a given tool and a given conception of rationality,
once the tools are embedded in a DA process, they can become independent
from conceptions of rationality with which they are historically or interpre-
tativelly associated.
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